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RUSSIAN FLOATING NUCLEAR REACTORS: LACUNAE
IN CURRENT INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL AND
MARITIME LAW AND THE NEED FOR PROACTIVE
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN THE
DEVELOPMENT OF SUSTAINABLE ENERGY SOURCES
Douglas John Stedingt
Abstract: During the second half of 2003, Russia announced plans to build barges
carrying two nuclear reactors capable of supplying electricity to a town of fifty thousand
people. Rapidly developing countries seem particularly interested in this proposal, as
these reactors can meet their growing power needs. In addition, these floating nuclear
reactors provide an alternative to coal, oil and natural gas, all sources of energy that
contribute to global warming. These reactors, however, pose a substantial risk to the
environment, particularly in light of Russia's lax environmental policies, and the design
of the barges themselves make them susceptible to a wide variety of threats.
Currently there are no international legal regimes that would either prescribe
enforceable standards for Russia regarding the design and operation of these reactors, or
impose liability on Russia in the event of an accident and resulting damage to the
environment. All of the relevant treaties administered by the International Atomic
Energy Agency have gaps that preclude them from imposing regulatory duties or liability
on Russia as a state, and its agents, in the event of an accident. Similarly, although both
international customary environmental law and the United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea impose upon nations the duty to prevent pollution of the marine
environment, the ability to enforce those duties and impose legal liability for their breach
remains in doubt. Therefore, the international community should either: 1) close the gaps
in current legal regimes (including treaty-based and customary law regimes) 2); develop a
new regime (either based on treaties, or through further development of customary
international law) that would effectively regulate and impose liability for damage to the
environment resulting from an accident involving these reactors; or 3) cooperate in
developing and deploying safer alternative technologies to fulfill the need for power
generation that these floating reactors address. Of these alternatives, the simplest is the
closing of current gaps in treaties, although the most effective may be a combination of
approaches that effectively utilizes the strengths of each alternative.
1. INTRODUCTION
In the second half of 2003 Russia announced plans to build small
nuclear reactors mounted on barges that would be moored off of multiple
? Ph.D., Earth Sciences, and Geochemistry, University of California, Santa Cruz, 2001; J.D.
University of Washington, expected 2005. The author is grateful for the valuable input of Professor
William H. Rogers, Professor Craig H. Allen, and Assistant Professor Michael Robinson-Dom. Professor
John E. Noyes at California Western School of Law also provided valuable input. Without their guidance,
this comment would not have been possible. In addition, the Editorial Staff of the Pacific Rim Law and
Policy Journal, including Bryn Floyd, Sean Sanada, Lara Fowler, and Matt Senechal provided crucial
editorial assistance.
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countries in the Pacific Rim, including India,' China,2 South Korea,3 and
Indonesia, to provide power to coastal areas. More recently, Russia also
expressed interest in cooperating with Libya to place a floating nuclear
power plant off of the Libyan coast. Although these proposed floating
nuclear reactors may help to provide energy needed in developing countries,
and an alternative to fossil fuel sources for that energy, they are not without
substantial environmental risk. That risk is exacerbated by the limited or
non-existent international legal regimes that would impose duties on Russia
to regulate the operation of those barges in a manner that minimizes risks,
and impose liability on Russia in the event of an accident. Therefore, as
Russia moves to exploit this technology, the international community should
take a proactive approach to ensure that the risks associated with these
reactors are minimized.
The positive reception received by Russia's proposals in many
countries demonstrates the emerging need for smaller power sources in
developing areas that could be filled by small, portable nuclear reactors.
Unlike older, land-based, stationary reactors that typically generate hundreds
to thousands of megawatts of electricity, 6 enough power for a large city,
these floating reactors would generate sixty megawatts of electricity, enough
power for a town of fifty thousand people.7 Due to their mobility, they
could desalinate water or provide power to coastal towns and could be
relocated to new areas as demand patterns shift.8 Recent reports suggest that
the first plant will be completed within the next three years.
This Comment argues that the impending completion of the first
floating nuclear reactor in Russia, and the risks that these floating nuclear
1 Vladimir Radyuhin, Russia Offers India Floating N-Plants, THE HINDU, Nov. 20, 2003, available
at 2003 WL 66828375.
2 Russian Firms Close in on China Nuclear Power Plant Deal, CHINA ENERGY REP. WKLY., Dec.
12, 2003, available at LEXIS, News Library.
Russia, South Korea Develop Cooperation in Nuclear Energy, BBC MONITORING INT'L REP., Oct.
23, 2003, available at LEXIS, News Library.
4 Atomic Energy Ministry to Sign Framework Agt with Indonesia, ITAR-TASS NEWS AGENCY, Aug.
25, 2003, available at LEXIS, News Library.
Russia Willing to Build Nuclear Power Plants in Libya, BBC MONITORING INT'L REP., Dec. 23,
2003, available at LEXIS, News Library.
6 As of March 2004 there were 440 nuclear reactors in operation globally, generating 361,696
megawatts of energy, averaging 820 megawatts per reactor. See World Nuclear Association, World
Nuclear Power Reactors 2002-04, and Uranium Requirements, available at http://www.world-
nuclear.org/info/reactors.htm (last visited May 21, 2004).
7 Eduard Fesko, Russian Floating Nuclear Reactors-Proliferation Risks, June 24, 2003, available
at htt://cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/020624.htm (last visited May 21, 2004).
Id.
Russia May Complete Floating Nuclear Power Plant in Three Years, BBC MONITORING INT'L
REP., Dec. 17, 2003, available at LEXIS, News Library.
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reactors pose to the environment, requires immediate action to proactively
shape Russia's construction and operation of these floating reactors in a
manner that minimizes the risks to the environment. Part II discusses the
emerging demand for energy in the Pacific Rim that may be partially met by
these floating reactors, the impacts of relying on fossil fuels to meet the
majority of this energy need, and alternative technologies that may be
substituted for Russia's proposed floating nuclear reactors. Part III outlines
the substantial risks to the environment associated with the Russian
proposal. Part IV then demonstrates that the three most likely avenues to
proactively address these risks-treaties and standards administered by the
International Atomic Energy Agency, customary international law, and the
environmental protection provisions of the United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Sea-all have gaps that render them inapplicable to the safe
construction and operation of these floating nuclear reactors. Finally, Part V
suggests three possible avenues to effectively address the risks posed by
these floating reactors: 1) modification of existing legal regimes; 2) creation
of a new regime to address these unique risks; or 3) use of international
cooperation and market-based incentives to substitute alternative
technologies for the Russian proposal.
II. ENERGY CONSUMPTION IN THE PACIFIC RIM COUNTRIES WILL
INCREASE DRAMATICALLY AS NATIONS INDUSTRIALIZE
The interests of India, China, Indonesia, and South Korea in the
Russian proposal to use small, portable, nuclear reactors as a source of
energy demonstrates the increasing demand of Pacific Rim nations for
energy and electricity. °  For example, China's domestic energy
consumption is expected to triple in the next twenty-five years, largely due
to an increase in home appliances such as air conditioners and refrigerators,
and energy use associated with cooking and heating." Other developing
nations, particularly those poised for strong economic growth in the Pacific
Rim, will see a similar growth in domestic electricity and energy
consumption.
12
Increasing coal, oil, and natural gas combustion are currently
forecasted to be the most common fuel sources used to meet the majority of
this demand, with coal being the most commonly utilized fuel in developing
'0 Energy consumption is forecasted to increase 58% globally between 2001 and 2025, with 40% of
this increase accounted for by Asia alone. See Energy Information Administration, International Energy
Outlook 2003, at 1, available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/oia/ieo/ (last visited May 21, 2004).
I id. at 4.
12 id.
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countries such as India and China.1 3 Industrialized nations, in contrast, are
expected to continue shifting away from coal to natural gas combustion.1 4 In
combination with increased fossil fuel consumption, Asian countries,
including China, South Korea, and India, are projected to dramatically
increase their nuclear capacity between 2001 and 2025.' 5 Even with such an
increase, however, nuclear power will still provide only a fraction of Asia's
energy compared to fossil fuel combustion.
6
Asia's projected reliance on fossil fuels has the potential to exacerbate
global climate change, with the impacts of that change being focused on
developing countries.1 7 There is broad scientific consensus that combustion
of fossil fuels, and its resulting emissions of greenhouse gases, is responsible
for most of the warming of the climate observed over the last fifty years1
8
and that this warming will continue,' 9 with diverse impacts on both humans
and the environment. Impacts of climate change include increased damage
to property due to floods, mudslides, landslides and avalanches, increased
soil erosion, decreased crop yields, decreased water quality and quantity,
increased risk of forest fires, increased risk of infectious disease, increased
coastal erosion, and ecosystem impacts such as damage to coral reefs and
mangroves. 21 Even though industrialized countries are responsible for the
majority of past greenhouse emissions, the adverse impacts associated with
13 Although the proportion of total energy produced globally by coal combustion is expected to
decrease, large increases in coal consumption in developing nations in Asia, including China and India, are
projected, with those two countries accounting for 75% of the total increase in coal use. Id. at 3.
14 Id.
" Id. at 102.
16 Id.
17 Id. at 12.
18 See generally Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate Change 2001. Synthesis
Report, Summary for Policymakers, available at http://www.ipcc.ch/ (last visited May 21, 2003)
[hereinafter IGPCC Synthesis Report].
'9 Id. at 31.
2o The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change quantifies the risk of adverse impacts on the
environment and human health in statistical ranges. "Very Likely" is defined as having a 90-99% chance
of occurring. "Likely" is defined as having a 66-90% chance of occurring. Consequences of global
warming that are very likely to occur include higher maximum temperatures, leading to more hot days and
heat waves over nearly all land areas. Corresponding to this increase in temperature is an increase in
minimum temperatures, and "fewer cold days, frost days and cold waves over nearly all land areas."
Projected impacts of increase in temperatures include increased incident of death and serious illness among
older age groups and the urban poor, heat stress on livestock, wildlife and crops, and increased electricity
demand, leading to a decrease in energy supply reliability. Consequences of global warming that are likely
to occur include more intense precipitation events, increased summer drying in mid-latitudes, leading to
increased risks of drought, increased intensity and frequencies of cyclones, droughts, floods and El Nifto
events, and increasing variability of Asian summer monsoon events, an important source of fresh water to
the Asian continent. Id. at 15-16, 31.
21 Id. at 15.
VOL. 13 No. 3
RUSSIAN FLOATING NUCLEAR REACTORS
the industrialized world's emissions are expected to fall disproportionately
on developing countries. 22
The mitigation of global warming will require the participation of all
countries in reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Developing countries can
facilitate this mitigation by decreasing their reliance on fossil fuels and
increasing use of non-fossil fuel energy sources, such as solar, tidal, and
even nuclear energy, if done in a manner that minimizes risks to the
environment. Russia's floating nuclear reactors could be part of this effort
to decrease the use of fossil fuels, but the mitigation of greenhouse gas
emissions must be weighed against the threat this particular technology
poses to the environment.
A. Environmental Justice Considerations Regarding Global Warming
The distribution of fossil fuel use impacts and the source of
greenhouse gases raise important environmental justice considerations. The
majority of greenhouse gas emissions have historically been the result of
fossil fuel combustion in wealthy, industrialized nations. Although the
effects of these emissions will impact all humans, they will "fall
disproportionately upon developing countries and poor persons within all
countries, and thereby exacerbate inequities in health status and access to
adequate food, clean water, and other resources. 24  Therefore, the same
developing countries increasingly relying on fossil fuel combustion to
develop their economies will also bear the most negative impacts of global
warming. In contrast, the benefits of past greenhouse gas emissions will be
enjoyed by developed countries, which did not experience the adverse
impacts of warming while developing, and consequently did not intemalize
the costs of such impacts.
B. Changing the Mixture of Power Sources in Countries of the Pacific
Rim Region Will Help Mitigate the Impacts of Global Warming
Although humans may be able to adapt to changes wrought by global
warming, technological diversification 25 may help delay or reduce thedamage from climate change. Humans may adapt to global warming, 26 for
22 Id. at 12.
23 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate Change 2001: Mitigation, Summary for
Policy Makers, at 4, available at http://www.ipcc.ch/ (last visited May 21, 2004) [hereinafter IGPCC
Summary for Policy Makers].
24 See IGPCC Synthesis Report, supra note 18, at 12.
2' See id.
26 IGPCC Summary for Policy Makers, supra note 23.
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instance, through changing the patterns of food growth, although that
adaptation will not completely mitigate the damage due to climate change.
Therefore, efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions are still necessary,
27because they will either delay or reduce the damage from climate change.
These efforts require new technologies and a switch to non-fossil fuel
burning power sources.28 Although this change in the mix of electricity
sources depends on many factors and will involve a variety of non-fossil fuel
technologies, nuclear power may be one of the more viable alternatives to
fossil fuels in terms of reducing greenhouse gas emissions.29
C. Alternative Nuclear Technologies May Meet the Need for Increased
Power Generation Without Resulting Greenhouse Gas Emissions
The projected mix of energy sources needed to meet the increased
demand in the Pacific Rim does not consider new nuclear technologies,
because these projections are based on currently utilized technologies.
Russia's floating reactors are a new application of an outdated, thirty-year
old Soviet-era naval reactor originally designed to power ships.30 There is
also concerted global effort to develop new nuclear reactor technologies,
some of which may be safer than the Russian floating reactor proposal. This
effort includes both national and multinational programs to design small,
modular reactors31 that could fill the emerging demand for energy that
cannot be met by established power grids.32
Many countries have national programs to develop new reactor
technologies.33 In addition to the floating reactor concept, Russia has
developed a lead-bismuth cooled fast reactor that may reduce the possibility
of severe accidents. 34 The reactor can be manufactured, delivered to a site
ready to operate, and then returned to the factory for disassembly after an
27 See IGPCC Synthesis Report, supra note 18, at 21.
28 See IGPCC Summary for Policy Makers, supra note 23, at 4.
29 For a discussion of the role nuclear energy can play in mitigating global warming, see World
Energy Council, Global Nuclear Energy in a Sustainable Development Perspective, Oct. 2001, available at
http://www.nea.fr/html/ndd/docs/2000/nddsustdev.pdf (last visited May 21, 2004) [hereinafter WEC
Sustainable Development Perspective].
30 See Fesko, supra note 7.
3 The IAEA defines a small reactor as one generating under 300 Mwe. See Small Nuclear Power
Reactors, UIC Nuclear Issues Briefing Paper #60, Nov. 2003, available at
http://www.uic.com.au/nip60.htm (last visited May 21, 2004).
32 id.
33 Debu Majumdar, Advanced Reactors Around the World, NUCLEAR PLANT J. EDITORIAL ARCHIVE
(2003), available at http://www.npjonline.com (last visited May 21, 2004).
34 Lead-cooled reactors use molten metal instead of water to conduct heat off the reactor core, and in
so doing avoid the corrosion problems of water-cooled reactors. Id.
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eight to ten year operating cycle.35 Similarly, India is developing smaller
reactors using thorium as a fuel source,36 and other countries such as South
Korea, Canada, France, Argentina, Japan, China, South Africa, and the
United States are developing similar small reactor designs.37
In addition to individual technological development, a group of
countries and international agencies are currently cooperating to develop
new reactor technologies, referred to as "Generation IV. ' 38  This group
identified new reactor concepts, including a lead-cooled small fast reactor
that may have significant advantages over existing reactor concepts.39
Assembled in a factory with a closed fuel cycle,4 ° this reactor has a long life,
is fairly difficult to dismantle-a feature that helps to deter the harvest of
nuclear materials that could be used in weapons-and is safer because the
use of lead as a coolant shields the reactor and is not as corrosive as other
coolants such as water.4' This reactor can be produced, shipped to a site
where it can provide power for thirty years, and then shipped back to the
production facility for servicing.42 Although this type of reactor seems ideal,
certain technical advances, including innovations in materials technology,
are necessary to produce it.43  In contrast, Russia proposes to complete its
first floating nuclear reactor in three years,44  thus raising immediate
environmental and safety concerns.
Japan's recent proposal to test the small reactor that it is developing in
a remote village in Alaska demonstrates the potential utility of these new




38 Argentina, Brazil, Canada, France, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Republic of South Africa, the
United Kingdom, the United States, and Euraton, Europe's Nuclear Agency, began this international effort
in January 2000. See What is Generation IV?, available at http://gen-iv.ne.doe.gov (last visited May 21,
2004).
39 U.S. Department of Energy, The U.S. Generation IV Implementation Strategy, Sept. 2003, at 4,
available at http://gen-iv.ne.doe.gov/ (last visited May 21, 2004) [hereinafter Gen IV Strategy].
4o A closed fuel cycle extracts uranium and plutonium through reprocessing of the spent fuel in the
reactor. This uranium and plutonium is then used in the fission process to generate more power. The net
result is the production of waste that does not have long-lived actinides as a component, resulting in waste
that will decay in a much shorter time, and is more manageable. See Argonne National Labs, Six Labs
Draft Plan to Develop Advanced Reactor Systems with Closed Fuel Cycle, available at
http://www.anl.gov:80/OPA/frontiers/d6ee.html (lasted visited May 21, 2004).
41 See Gen IV. Strategy, supra note 39, at 4.
42 id.
43 id.
44 See Russia May Complete Floating Nuclear Power Plant in Three Years, supra note 9.
45 Joel Gay, Village Invited to Test Cheap, Clean Nuclear Power, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Oct.
21, 2003.
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power, 46 is similar to the Generation IV project's lead-cooled reactor.47 Like
the sealed design of the Generation IV's lead-cooled reactor, the Japanese
design reportedly has a very low chance of releasing nuclear material, and,
because of its size and design, is unable to melt down, precluding
Chemobyl-type accidents.48 Therefore, because of their safer design, these
small Japanese reactors may provide a safer alternative to the floating
Russian reactors, although they are still in development and, unlike the
Russian proposal, may not be available in the near future. Considering the
risks associated with the Russian floating reactors, however, waiting to
develop new, safer technologies may very well be warranted.
III. ENVIRONMENTAL AND SAFETY CONCERNS RELATED TO RUSSIA'S
FLOATING NUCLEAR REACTORS
Russia's likely deployment of floating nuclear reactors is starting to
draw attention from a variety of concerned parties.49 This concem relates to
a general public wariness about the expansion of nuclear power, given
historical nuclear reactor use, the magnitude of environmental damage
resulting from past accidents, and the potential for damage from future
catastrophes. 50
There are multiple safety concerns associated with the Russian
proposal. For instance, the reactors run on highly enriched uranium, 51 which
is more readily converted into weapons-grade uranium than other fuels used
in nuclear reactors.52 As a result, the reactors are likely to be targets for
terrorists and countries interested in obtaining uranium for nuclear
weapons. 53 In addition, Russia's nuclear agency, Minatom, has a poor track
record of environmental protection, with many instances of radioactive
46 Id.
47 See Gen IV. Strategy, supra note 39, at 4.
49 See Gay, supra note 45.
49 Andrey Mikhaylov, Floating Nuclear Power Plant to Emerge in Russia, BELLONA FOUNDATION
NEWS, Nov. 7, 2002, available at http://www.bellona.no/en/international/russia/npps/27075.htrnl (last
visited May 21, 2004); see also Fesko, supra note 7.
'o Reflecting the concerns of many international organizations, Greenpeace contends that "safe
nuclear power is a myth," basing these contentions on the history of nuclear energy, and the resulting
contamination to the environment. See generally Greenpeace International, Nuclear Campaign, available
at http://www.greenpeace.org/international_en/campaigns/intro?campaign_id=3940 (last visited May 21,
2004).
5' Highly enriched uranium is defined as containing greater than 20% of the 235 isotope of uranium.
See Fesko, supra note 7.
52 id.
53 id.
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contamination and questionable handling of nuclear waste.5 4  The Soviet
Navy's history of nuclear reactors and their treatment and disposal also
raises concerns, as that history suggests a lack of proper stewardship of the
environment. 55  As a result, the safe operation of these reactors is in
question.
Russia is also currently facing a lack of funds for a new nuclear
program. 6 Nevertheless, the floating reactor concept is part of Russia's
current "crash program of rapid ex ansion" of its nuclear generating
capacity over the next two decades. Because funding for all Russian
nuclear projects is scarce, however, 8 both scientists and scholars are
concerned about Russia's practice of diverting funds obtained for the
disposal of foreign nuclear waste away from clean-up efforts towards
expanding its nuclear program.5 9 This diversion of funds towards new
nuclear activities and away from addressing historic contamination issues
suggests that stewardship of the environment is not a priority in Russia, and,
as a result, the safe operation of these floating nuclear reactors may also not
be a priority.
In addition to 0resent funding concerns, the environmental and safety
history of Minatom 0 raises concerns that the agency is not prepared to
embark on programs such as the floating reactor program.61 One of the most
prominent examples of flawed Russian environmental practices is the
ongoing pumping of liquid radioactive wastes into underground tunnels from
a nuclear chemical plant in Seversk.62 In addition, despite Minatom's
denials of responsibility for releases of radioactive waste from military
facilities in the Tomsk region, the Tom and Romashka rivers have the
highest degree of radioactive contamination in the world.63  Moreover,
problems such as leaks and other incidents at civilian nuclear plants are
54 Paul Josephson, Minatom: Dreams of Glory, 40 BULL. ATOM. SCIENTISTS (2002), available at
2002 WL 9055553.
55 For instance, the Bellona Institute, an organization monitoring the effects of Russia's nuclear
activities on the North Sea express concerns that these floating reactors may become "floating Chemobyls."
See Mikhaylov, supra note 49.




60 Minatom is the parent agency of the publicly traded company Malaya Energetika, the company
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common 64 and safety at Russian nuclear plants remains an issue,65 as is
waste disposal and handling.
66
The Russian Navy's treatment and disposal of nuclear reactors
suggests a similar lack of concern regarding environmental protection.
67
The Northern Fleet documented fifty-two accidents involving nuclear
submarines during the Cold War, and made a practice of dumping low-level
waste into the Barents Sea.68 In addition to these historic practices, the lack
of funding for the Russian nuclear 6program has hampered the
decommissioning of Russian naval reactors.6 This lack of funding results in
improper storage of spent fuel assemblies, contributes to a deteriorating
infrastructure, and leads to widespread contamination of the
decommissioning facilities. 70 This deteriorating infrastructure also poses a
major hazard to the surrounding population and environment. 71 The
international community, including bordering states that are threatened by
these practices, have recognized this hazard and, as a result, are participating
in international efforts to clean up these facilities.72
The unique design of Russia's floating reactors magnifies the
underlying risks associated with Russia's nuclear program. Unlike land-
based reactors, the current floating design does not include a concrete
containment wall.73  As a result, these floating reactors are particularly
vulnerable to terrorist attack and natural threats like tsunamis, earthquakes,
and weather.74 Another design flaw is the plan to store spent fuel on the
barge.75 This presents the legitimate concern that extra waste may be
dumped overboard if there is no room for it on the barge, a reportedly
76
common practice in the Soviet Navy.
Despite Russia's poor history of responsible nuclear safety practices,
these floating nuclear reactors are likely to be deployed to help meet the




67 For a detailed discussion of the issues associated with the decommissioning of the Northern Fleet,
see Justin Mellor, Radioactive Waste and Russia 's Northern Fleet: Sinking the Principles of International
Environmental Law, 28 DENY. J. INT'L. L. & POL'Y 51 (1999).
's Id. at 54.
69 Id. at 54-55.
70 Id.
71 Id. at 55.
72 Id. at 57.
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fuel consumption, to diversify energy sources, and encourage the still-
nascent development of other potentially safer nuclear technologies.
Because of Russia's likely construction and deployment of floating nuclear
reactors, the international community faces a choice: either proactively
address the risks associated with these reactors, or wait until an accident
occurs and respond after the environmental damage has occurred. Current
international law does not sufficiently address these risks, but existing laws
could be amended, new laws passed, or a new emphasis on technological
innovation fostered to address these concerns.
IV. RUSSIA'S LEGAL DUTIES REGARDING THE DEPLOYMENT OF FLOATING
REACTORS UNDER CURRENT INTERNATIONAL LAW
Though comprehensive, existing international legal regimes are
insufficient to proactively address the unique risks created by Russia's
proposed floating nuclear reactors. Such regimes include the standards and
treaties administered by the International Atomic Energy Agency
77
("IAEA"), international environmental law, and the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea. Accordingly, these regimes should be
modified, new legal regimes should be developed, or other avenues such as
market-based incentives should be explored to minimize the possibility of
damage to human health and the environment from these floating nuclear
reactors.
An ideal legal regime to address the risks associated with Russia's
floating reactors would include at least three specific features. First, it
should prescribe strict regulatory standards that would bind Russia to
minimize risks in designing and operating these floating reactors. Second, it
should provide injured parties a method of recovery for damage caused by
operation or accidents associated with these reactors. A liability mechanism
would promote accountability and help minimize risks. Third, a regulatory
regime should also have a mechanism that could prevent the deployment of
these floating reactors completely if the risks were found to be unacceptable
to the international community, perhaps through a licensing authority.
Although numerous laws exist, this ideal regime does not yet exist because
of the unique nature of the current problem.
Alternatively, a less desirable legal regime would at least prescribe
standards to bind Russia in its development and operation of these floating
nuclear reactors, but may not proscribe the liability framework or
" The International Atomic Energy Agency is the principle organ responsible for treaties and
standards regulating the peaceful use of nuclear power for energy production.
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preventative mechanisms of an ideal regime. Successfully cobbling together
such a regime from existing legal frameworks, however, is highly unlikely;
there is a large body of existing standards that may be applied, but ensuring
compliance with these standards by Russia is difficult. As discussed below,
the deployment of these floating reactors is likely to exploit current gaps in
international law. Therefore, the international community needs to either
develop a new legal regime to regulate Russia's plan, or explore other
avenues such as offering countries interested in Russia's floating nuclear
reactors alternative energy sources.
Although there may be many creative international approaches that
could be used to regulate Russia in its endeavor, this Comment focuses on
three potential legal regimes that may each provide some of the components
necessary to address this unique situation. These potential regimes include
1) the regime administered by the IAEA; 2) international environmental law;
and 3) the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea ("UNCLOS"),
the major treaty governing the use of the world's seas. Despite the potential
that all three regimes have for regulating Russia's floating nuclear reactors,
each of them, on its own, fall short of providing an effective mechanism to
regulate these floating nuclear reactors.
A. The International Atomic Energy Agency Lacks the Authority to Make
Russia Operate Floating Reactors in a Manner Acceptable to the
International Community
The current legal regime administered by the IAEA does not
proactively address the environmental risks created by Russia's nuclear
reactors. Rather, the IAEA's potentially applicable conventions can only
prescribe standards and guidelines, without the necessary enforcement
mechanisms, or at best, provide for international assistance after an accident
has occurred. The 1994 Convention on Nuclear Safety78 promotes the safe
operation of nuclear facilities, while two other conventions, the Convention
on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident79 and the Convention on
Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency, 80
71 1994 Convention On Nuclear Safety, IAEA, Sept. 20, 1994, IAEA Doc. INFCIRC/449, 33 I.L.M.
1514, available at http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Conventions/nukesafety.htrml [hereinafter
CNS] (last visited May 21, 2004).
79 Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident, Nov. 18, 1986, 1439 U.N.T.S. 275, 25
I.L.M. 1395, available at http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/infcircs/Others/lnf335.shtnil (last
visited Apr. 29, 2004).
'o Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency, Sept. 26,
1986, 1457 U.N.T.S. 133, 25 I.L.M. 1377, available at
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/inf336.shtml (last visited May 21, 2004).
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are designed to lessen the impact of an accident after it has occurred. If
Russia chooses not to comply with these non-obligatory standards and
guidelines, there is little that can be done to force its compliance.
1. The 1994 Convention on Nuclear Safety Does Not Apply to Floating
Reactors
Despite Russia's acquiescence to its terms in 1996,81 the Convention
on Nuclear Safety ("CNS") does not apply to the particular floating nuclear
reactors currently at issue. The CNS's purpose includes "promot[ing] an
effective nuclear safety culture"82 through implementation of prescribed
standards, 3 followed by self reporting and subsequent peer review of a
nation's nuclear safety program.88 These obligations would provide valuable
transparency for implementing a safety program for the floating reactors.
However, the drafters of the CNS consciously decided to create voluntary
obligations that only apply to "land-based civil nuclear power plant[s]"
under the jurisdiction of a party to the CNS.85 This restriction would exempt
Russia's floating reactors unless the CNS was modified to include this new
class of floating reactors. Even if such a modification occurred, the self-
reporting obligations remain voluntary and would do little to force Russia to
comply with higher safety standards that may be desired by other countries.
2. Accident Response Conventions Will Not Contribute to the Safe
Operation of Floating Reactors
Russia is a party to two conventions that, together, provide for
international assistance in the event of a nuclear accident, but these
conventions only apply to accident response, and not accident prevention.
For instance, the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident
6
obligates parties to notify states that may be affected by a nuclear accident, 7
while the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or
Radiological Emergency prescribes international cooperation in response to
a nuclear accident. Drafted in response to the Chernobyl accident,89 these
8' See IAEA, Status of the Convention On Nuclear Safety, available at
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Conventions/nukesafety.html (last updated Sept. 2003) (last
visited May 21, 2004).
82 CNS, supra note 78, pmbl. § iv.
83 Id, art. 4.
14 Id. art. 5.
"s Id. art. 2.
16 Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident, supra note 79.
17 Id. art. 2.
88 Id.
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conventions provide an important framework for international response to
nuclear accidents but will not facilitate the safe operation of nuclear reactors.
3. The Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage is
Unable to Impose Liability on Russia in the Event of an Accident
Liability conventions provide a mechanism by which an injured party
may seek compensation from a state for its injury and, therefore, can provide
an important deterrence mechanism that may lead to greater safety in the
operation of these floating reactors. However, the liability convention that
would be most relevant to the nuclear barges, the Vienna Convention on
Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage ("Vienna Convention"), does not apply
to Russia, which has signed but not ratified it. 90 Even if Russia ratifies the
Vienna Convention, it may not apply to floating nuclear reactors due to a
definition similar to the one in the CNS.91
The Vienna Convention imposes liability upon operators of nuclear
installations. 92  As drafted in 1963 (for land-based civilian reactors), the
original convention defined a "nuclear installation" as "any nuclear reactor
other than one with which a means of sea or air transport is equipped for use
as a source of power, whether for propulsion thereof or for any other
purpose. 93 If the barge upon which these reactors are installed qualifies as a
means of sea transport,94 then the floating nuclear reactors arguably are
exempt under this provision. The Vienna Convention further defines a
"nuclear installation" as "any facility where nuclear material is stored." 95
Thus, if spent fuel is stored on the barge as proposed,96 the Vienna
Convention may apply to these floating reactors. Despite a possible
89 See IAEA, Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological
Emergency-Background, available at
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Conventions/cenna.html (last visited May 21, 2004). See also
IAEA, Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident, available at
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Conventions/cacnare.html (last visited May 21, 2004).
90 Russia signed the convention on May 8, 1996, but has not ratified it. See Latest Status to the
Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, Mar. 20, 1996, available at,
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Conventions/liability.html (last visited May 21, 2004).
91 Compare CNS, supra note 78, art. 2 with Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear
Damage, art. I(j)(i), May 21, 1963, 1063 U.N.T.S. 265, 2 I.L.M. 727 [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
mlSee id. art. 11(l).
93 Id. art. l10)(i).
94 If the barges are defined as a method of sea transport, they appear likely to be exempt from the
Vienna Convention. However, defining these barges as a method of sea transport is critical in applying the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea to these barges, which contains numerous obligations to
prevent the pollution of the marine environment through accidents associated with vessels. See infra Part
IV.C. 1.
95 Vienna Convention, supra note 91, at art. Ij)(iii).
96 See Fesko, supra note 7.
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application under nuanced definitional interpretations, it remains
questionable whether the Vienna Convention would apply under its original
definitions.
It seems more likely that the reactor barges would be covered under
the 1997 amendments to the Vienna Convention. The purpose of the 1997
amendments was to "provide for broader scope, increased amount of liability
of the operator of a nuclear installation, and enhanced means for securing
adequate and equitable compensation, 97 in the event of a nuclear accident.
As a means of broadening the scope, the IAEA Board of Governors received
discretion to include within the convention facilities that originally were not
covered, including "such other installations in which there are nuclear fuel
or radioactive products or waste." 98 Under this provision, the IAEA could
specifically regulate the floating reactors, while preserving the original
convention's overall exemption of reactors used in sea transportation. Even
if the Board of Governors implemented such a regulation, Russia would still
have to ratify the Vienna Convention to be bound by it and liable for any
damage resulting from an accident involving a floating reactor. Given this
kind of potential liability, it seems unlikely that Russia will ratify the Vienna
Convention in the foreseeable future.
B. Under International Environmental Law, Russia has a Duty to Ensure
that Activities Within Its Jurisdiction or Control Do Not Pollute the
Environment Beyond Its Borders
Although international customary law articulates duties that Russia
likely is obligated to follow in operating the floating reactors, it may be
difficult to enforce liability if a breach of such duties occurs. Article 38 of
the treaty establishing the International Court of Justice uses international
custom as a valid source of law in international tribunals; such custom is
evidenced by "a general practice accepted as law." 99 Breach of such general
practices accepted as law may lead to the imposition of liability on a state,100
and the threat of that liability may cause a state to take action to prevent the
imposition of liability.
These principles have been used in the development of international
environmental law. One of the seminal international environmental law
97 Protocol to Amend the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, Sept. 12, 1997,
pmbl., 36 I.L.M. 1454, 1455.
9' Vienna Convention, supra note 91, at art. l(l)(iv).
99 Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38(l)(b), 59 Stat. 1055, 1060 (1945).
1oo For instance, in the Trail Smelter case, Canada was found liable for transboundary pollution that
harmed the United States. See Trail Smelter Arbitral Decision, 35 AM. J. INT'LL. 684 (1941).
JUNE 2004
PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL
cases addressing this concept is Trail Smelter Arbitral Decision.'°  In Trail
Smelter, the United States brought a claim against Canada that resulted in
the signing of a convention that created a special arbitral panel. 0 2 The
United States alleged that pollution from Canada had crossed the border into
the United States and caused damage to resources and human health.
103
After a long trial held before the tribunal created to address this issue, that
tribunal awarded monetary damages to the United States and stated two
fundamental principles of international environmental law. First, states have
a duty to ensure that activities under their control do not cause damage to the
environment of other states, where that damage is of a serious consequence
and is demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence.'04 Second, if damage
to another state does occur, the polluter should pay.'05 These principles have
subsequently been reiterated. For example, Principle 21 of the United
Nations Conference on the Human Environment at Stockholm ("Stockholm
Convention") declares that states have the "responsibility to ensure that
activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the
environment of other States or to areas beyond the limits of national
jurisdiction."' 6 More recently, the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment
and Development again emphasized this principle in the same language as
the Stockholm Convention. 10
1. International Legal Liability is Not an Effective Deterrent Because
International Liability May Not Lead to Recovery of Damages
Despite this ideal of global environmental responsibility, actual
enforcement and recovery for liability stemming from trans-boundary
environmental harm remains difficult. The difficulty in seeking
compensation for trans-border environmental damage is poignantly
highlighted in two accidents involving Russian nuclear technology: a 1978





'04 Id. at 684.
105 id.
106 Stockholm Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, princ. 21,
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/14/Rev.1, 11 I.L.M. 1416 (1972).
'07 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, princ. 2, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 151/26
(Vol. I), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 874, 876 (1992).
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a. The crash of Cosmos 954
The first of these accidents involved the crash of a Russian nuclear-
powered satellite, Cosmos 954, in northern Canada in 1978.108 Launched by
the Russians in late 1977 and powered by a nuclear reactor containing highly
enriched uranium, 1°9 this satellite experienced technical failures that resulted
in its reentry into the earth's atmosphere on January 24, 1978."10 Contrary to
the Soviet Union's back channel assurances, the reactor did not burn up and
disperse its radioactive core throughout the upper atmosphere, as it was
designed to do upon reentry.1 ' Rather, it spread radioactive debris, some of
which was of lethal radioactivity, 12 across a large swath of Northem
Canada, including the Northwest Territories and the provinces of Alberta
and Saskatchewan. 1 3 The United States and Canada cooperated in cleaning
up the debris, but only a small amount of the satellite was recovered.
114
Total clean up costs paid by the Canadian government exceeded US$ 14
million.1 5
Canada relied on both an international treaty and international
environmental law in its efforts to recover this cost. 16 The treaty claim was
based on Article II of the Convention on International Liability for Damage
Caused by Space Objects 17 ("Space Liability Convention"), a relatively
unique treaty that abrogated state sovereign immunity and conferred strict
los Canada: Claim Against the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for the Damage Caused by Soviet
Cosmos 954, Pub. No. FLA-268, available at http://www.dal.ca/-wwwlaw/kindred.intllaw/SOVIET.htm
(last visited January 24, 2004) [hereinafter Cosmos 954 Settlement].
109 See Gus W. Weiss, Life and Death of Cosmos 954, STUD. IN INTELLIGENCE (1978). This
document was originally a classified document that was declassified in the 1990s, detailing the joint
response of Canada and the United States to the threat of Cosmos 954 reentering the atmosphere over North
America, referred to as Operation Morning Light.
1o Cosmos 954 Settlement, supra note 108.
111 The Soviet Union responded to inquiries by officials involved in Operation Morning Light with
reassurances that the reactor onboard Cosmos 954 was designed to "bum up on reentry." See Weiss, supra
note 109, at 4. See also Cosmos 954 Settlement, supra note 108, at para. 5 (detailing Soviet assurances that
even if the reactor did not bum up, there "should not be any sizeable hazard and that in places of impact
there could only be insignificant local pollution requiring very limited measures of disactivation.").
112 See Cosmos 954 Settlement, supra note 108, para. 10.
": Id. at para. 9.
"4 See generally id.
15 Id. at. para. 8.
1:6 See generally id.
17 Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, Mar. 29, 1972, 24
U.S.T. 2389, 961 U.N.T.S. 187 (entered into force Sept. 1, 1972) [hereinafter Space Liability Convention].
This treaty was negotiated in the United Nations and adopted by General Assembly Resolution 2777 (XVI)
in 1972. Since its adoption, 81 states have ratified the convention, and 26 others have signed it.
JUNE 2004
PACIFIC RIm LAW & POLICY JOURNAL
liability upon the Soviet Union for the accident." 8  In addition, Canada
relied on the general international law principles articulated in Trail
Smelter." 9 Although Russia settled the case in 1981 for a lump sum, the
principles upon which the settlement was made are unclear because the
settlement does not contain a clear indication of what law had been
applied. 20  As a result, this case is not useful in further defining an
international standard for trans-boundary environmental liability.121
Nevertheless, the Cosmos 954 settlement process provides an
interesting illustration of how the treaty's presence shaped the negotiations
between Canada and the Soviet Union,' an assertion supported by the
Soviet's rejections of liability except for that imposed by the 1972 Space
Liability Convention.12 3 The Canadian/Soviet negotiations also illustrate the
difficulty of recovering compensation for harm caused by another state.
Even with an applicable convention, Canada was still able to only recover
costs of clean up, not compensation for damage to the environment.
24
Finally, the careful rejection of customary law principles by the Soviet
Union reinforces the inability to recover for such damage relying solely on
those principles.
b. The 1986 accident at Chernobyl: the "polluter gets paid "principle
In 1986, the notorious Russian nuclear accident at Chernobyl sparked
changes in international law, but did not result in a clear mechanism for
recovery of environmental damage from a nuclear accident. The Chernobyl
reactor operators were performing a test on the reactor cores when one
reactor experienced a loss of coolant pressure, partly because the safety
interlocks designed to shut the reactor down if coolant pressure became
insufficient had been circumvented. 25 Unfortunately, this loss of coolant
'" Space Liability Convention, supra note 117, at art. II. (declaring that "[a] launching State shall be
absolutely liable to pay compensation for damage caused by its space object on the surface of the earth or
to aircraft flight.").
119 See Cosmos 954 Settlement, supra note 108.
120 RENt LEFEBER, TRANSBOUNDARY ENVIRONMENTAL INTERFERENCE AND THE ORIGIN OF STATE
LIABILITY 164 (1996); see also Cosmos 954 Settlement, supra note 108.
121 See LEFEBER, supra note 120, at 164.
22 See id.
123 See id.
124 Russia eventually paid a lump sum that was less than the amount spent by Canada on clean up.
See generally Cosmos 954 Settlement, supra note 108.
125 See generally Nuclear Energy Agency, Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and
Development, Chernobyl: Assessment of Radiological and Health Impacts, 2002 Update of Chernobyl, Ten
Years On (2000), available at http://www.nea.fr/hn]lrp/chemobyl/chemobyl.htl (last visited May 21,
2004).
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led to a surge in heat production and to two explosions of the reactor core.126
These explosions resulted in widespread environmental contamination and
years of negotiation to close the reactor after the accident. 27  Along with
awareness of the devastation that a nuclear accident can cause, Chemobyl
created a new and unexpected outcome that violates international
environmental law: the notion that the polluter gets paid.
Rather than bearing the financial responsibility for this accident, the
Soviet Union and, after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Ukraine,
received tremendous financial assistance, both to assist the clean up efforts,
and in exchange for finally closing the reactor down in 1995.128 The result
of these payments, however, is the undermining of the international principle
of state responsibility, with the threat of future accidents used as a "negative
lever or a form of environmental blackmail in order to obtain financial
assistance,"'129 which results in the creation of a "polluter gets paid"
principle. 130 The creation of the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a
Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency' 31 is a codification of this
principle, as it encourages and promotes international assistance in the clean
up of a nuclear accident. 132 Not only is the current international nuclear
regulatory regime ineffective in addressing the risks posed by floating
reactors, it also creates incentives for the deployment of such reactors by
transferring liability from the potential individual polluter to the greater
global community.
Given the lack of fora for enforcing liability under international law,
the experiences of Cosmos 954 and Chernobyl demonstrate that relying
solely on customary international law is unlikely to provide an effective
mechanism to require compensation from Russia in the event of an accident
involving one of its floating nuclear reactors. Despite repeated calls for
international liability regimes for environmental damage, there has been an
inability to widely develop those regimes. 33  The current international
126 Id.
127 id.
128 This money was in addition to the international efforts to clean up the accident itself. Estimated at
US$ 2.3 billion, this money was intended to both assist in the final closure of the plant, and to provide
monetary assistance in mitigating the loss of power generation capacity due to that closure. Id. at 115-20.
129 Justin Mellor, The Negative Effects of Chernobyl on International Environmental Law. The
Creation of the Polluter Gets Paid Principle, 17 WIS. INT'L L. J. 65, 66 (1999).
130 Id.
131 Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency, supra
note 80.
132 See supra Part IV.A.3.
33 See LEFEBER, supra note 120, at 5. (noting that statements contained in the Stockholm Declaration
(1972) and the Rio Declaration (1992) both include "urgent appeals to develop international liability law,"
but that international liability law is yet to emerge.).
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regime offers little legal substance that will significantly shape Russia's
decisions on deploying floating reactors. These experiences, along with the
international assistance required to clean up Russia's Northern Fleet,
suggests precisely the opposite: Russia now can proceed without
considering, or internalizing the trans-border risks posed by its nuclear
policies.
C. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea Prescribes
Duties to Prevent Pollution to the Marine Environment, but it is
Unclear if There is an Effective Enforcement Mechanism for Breach
of Those Duties
Due to the lack of applicable treaties and standards and the inversion
of the customary "polluter pays principle" after Chernobyl, both treaties and
customary international law are ineffective regimes in terms of imposing
enforceable liability on Russia in the event of an accident involving one of
its floating nuclear reactors. The United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea ("UNCLOS"), 134 however, provides a framework for protecting the
marine environment If there are effective enforcement mechanisms within
the UNCLOS, that treaty may be able to provide the necessary threat of
liability to shape Russia's behavior.
Reflecting the customary international law principles articulated in
Trail Smelter and the Stockholm Convention, the UNCLOS requires states
to protect and preserve the environment 35 and prescribes measures that are
designed to deal with all sources of pollution 36  to the marine
environment. 137  Having ratified this treaty on March 12, 1997,138 under
Article 217,139 Russia has the primary responsibilities as the flag state, or
state under whose jurisdiction the floating nuclear reactors operate.140  The
131 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 3, 21 I.L.M.
1261 (1982) [hereinafter UNCLOS].
131 Id. at art. 192.
136 Id.at arts. 207-12.
137 The "marine environment" is not defined in the UNCLOS. However, Article 1(4) states that the
marine environment includes estuaries, and the usage of the term in the UNCLOS suggests that the marine
environment includes estuaries, territorial waters, and the high seas. See infra, Part IV.C.2.b.
138 See Chronological List of Ratifications to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea,
available at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/reference-files/chronological lists-of ratifications.htm (last
visited May 21, 2004).
139 This article prescribes the duty of the flag state to ensure that vessels under their jurisdiction
comply with relevant international standards and rules, for the prevention, reduction, and control of
pollution to the environment. UNCLOS, supra note 134, at art. 217 (1). This article also prescribes the
duty of the flag state to prevent the operation of a vessel that cannot meet these requirements. Id. at art.
217(2).
"40 Id. at arts. 91, 94.
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host state in whose waters the barge is moored,' 4' however, may also have
duties to prevent pollution from these floating nuclear reactors. As
discussed below, Article 211 in particular contains numerous obligations
that apply to vessel-source pollution. 142
As in the conventions administered by the IAEA, definitional issues
again affect whether the UNCLOS will apply to these floating reactors.
First, Article 211 applies only to vessels; these barges must meet the
definition of a "vessel" in order for the Article 211 obligations to bind
Russia.1 43 Second, these duties apply to parties to the UNCLOS that have
jurisdiction or control over the barges. Russia, as the flag state, would be the
most obvious state to have jurisdiction or control over these barges, but the
host state,144 through contractual relationships, could also have jurisdiction
or control over these barges.
The terms "flag state,"1 45  "territorial waters"' 46  and "internal
waters" 1 47 all have specific meanings under the UNCLOS. While "flag
state" is not explicitly defined in the UNCLOS, its meaning can be deduced
from Articles 91 and 94,148 with the flag state being the state that has granted
its nationality to a ship. 149 "Territorial waters" are defined in the UNCLOS,
and extend up to twelve miles out to sea 15 from the "baseline," defined as
"the low-water line along the coast as marked on large-scale charts officially
recognized by the coastal State."' 5'1 "Internal waters" are defined as waters
on the landward side of the baseline. 
52
As discussed below, the extent of the marine environment is poorly
defined in the UNCLOS. This is important because the obligations of the
UNCLOS are centered on pollution of the marine environment. If the
marine environment extends to internal waters as well as territorial waters,
141 If these barges are under the shared control of the host state and the flag state, then the host state,
under Article 211, has a duty to prevent, reduce and control pollution of the marine environment as well.
UNCLOS supra note 134, at art. 211.
142 See infra Part IV.C.2.
43 UNCLOS supra note 134, at art. 211. Whether a floating nuclear barge is a "vessel" is explored in
Section IV.C.I infra.
144 Here, the host state is the state that is contracting with Russia and is mooring these floating
nuclear reactors in its waters.
'45 Articles 91 and 94 of the UNCLOS provide the closest definition of a "flag state." See the
discussion of Walker and Noyes' proposed definition, infra note 148.
146 LNCLOS supra note 134, at arts. 3, 4.
1 Id. art. 8.
148 George K. Walker & John E. Noyes, Definitions for the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention-Part II,
33 CAL. W. INT'L L.I. 191,204-05 (2003).
U49 L'NCLOS supra note 134, at art. 91.
o d. at arts. 3-5.
"' Id. at art. 5.
"z Id. at art. 8(1).
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then that duty would be imposed on those states that have jurisdiction over
these barges in their internal waters. However, the UNCLOS only
superficially addresses internal waters, leaving a state with full jurisdiction
and sovereignty over these waters.1 53 If internal waters are not a part of the
marine environment, then a host state would not be bound by the obligations
of Articles 192 and 194 to prevent pollution to those waters. Therefore, the
UNCLOS duties not to pollute the marine environment apply to both a host
state and the flag state, but depend on the barge first being defined as a
vessel, the location of the barge in the host state's waters, and the extent of
the marine environment.
1. Russia's Floating Reactors Are Vessels as Defined by International
Law and Proposed Definitions for the UNCLOS and, Therefore, Are
Subject to the Requirements of the UNCLOS
Although the term "vessel" is not explicitly defined in the UNCLOS,
usage in this and other conventions suggests a clear working definition. In
the English version of the UNCLOS, "vessel" is used interchangeably with
the term "ship," while Russian and Spanish translations use one word,
suggesting that "vessel" and "ship" have the same meaning. 154 Other
conventions contain definitions that can guide the development of a
definition for the UNCLOS, 55 including the 1962 amendments to the 1954
Oil Pollution Convention,156 the MARPOL 73/78 Convention,' 57 and the
United Nations Convention on Conditions for Registration of Ships.
158
Further, the International Convention on Salvage of 1969 defines a vessel as
... ERIK JAAP MOLENAAR, COASTAL STATE JURISDICTION OVER VESSEL-SOURCE POLLUTION 185
(1998).
154 Walker & Noyes, supra note 148, at 217.
155 Id. at 217-18.
16 1962 Amendments to the 1954 Convention for Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil, Apr. 11,
1962, Annex, art. 1(1). 17 U.S.T. 1523, 1524, 600 U.N.T.S. 332, 334 (defining a ship as "any sea-going
vessel of any type whatsoever, including floating craft, whether self-propelled or towed by another vessel,
makin a sea voyage.").
7 Protocol of 1978 Relating to International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships,
1973, Feb. 17, 1978, art. 1, 17 I.L.M. 546; Annex: Modifications and Additions to the International
Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973, Annex I. 1340 U.N.T.S. 61, 63, 66, reprinted
in 12 I.L.M. 1319 (defining a ship as a "vessel of any type whatsoever operating in the marine
environment.").
'58 United Nations Convention on the Conditions for Registration of Ships, Feb. 7, 1986, 26 I.L.M.
1229 (1987).
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"any ship or craft, or any structure capable of navigation."'' 5 9 Finally, various
other conventions liberally define a ship as any seagoing vessel.
60
Relying on these conventions and definitions, Professors Walker
recently authored a definition of vessel consistent with both general usage of
the term in international agreements, and the specific purposes of the
UNCLOS. 161 That definition states that a:
"[s]hip or vessel ha[s] the same interchangeable meaning in the
English language version of the 1982 [UNCLOS]. Ship is
defined as a vessel of any type whatsoever operating in the
marine environment, including hydrofoil boats, air-cushion
vehicles, submersibles, floating craft and floating platforms."
162
The floating Russian nuclear barges fit the definition of a vessel under
both existing international law, and the proposed definition above. First,
these barges are designed to be portable; indeed, the purpose of mounting
the nuclear reactors on a barge is to provide a mobile source of power both
to the Russian Far North East and to countries abroad.1 63  Second, these
barges will be used for transporting the reactors, as well as equipment and
personnel, in the marine environment when they move either from Russia to
the host country's waters, or back to Russia for servicing. Third, when
moored and providing power to a country, the barge will serve as a floating
platform for the reactors. Although there is some controversy regarding
whether the above definition should include jack-up rigs, 164 or platforms that
can be transported on the seas and then converted to a stationary platform on
supports that extend to the sea bottom, there is no indication that these
barges will be built in such a manner. However, Professor Noyes, in his
comments on Professor Walker's definition, notes that, due to the intent of
"9 International Convention on Salvage, Apr. 28, 1989. art. l(b), S. Treaty Doc. 102-12.
'60 Id. art. 11.2, (defining a ship as "(a) any sea-going vessel or any type whatsoever, and (b) any
floating craft"); Hazardous and Noxious Substances Convention Nov. 1996, Art. 1.1, 35 I.L.M. 1406, 1415
(1996) (defining a ship as "any seagoing vessel and seaborne craft, of any type whatsoever"); International
Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Co-operation Nov. 30, 1990, art. 2(3), 30 I.L.M.
733, 737 (1991) (defining a ship as "a vessel of any type whatsoever operating in the marine environment
and includes hydrofoil boats, air-cushion vehicles, submersibles, and floating craft of any type.").
Although these conventions often limit the definition of a ship to include those classes of ships the
convention is drafted to regulate, the common thread in all these definitions is that a vessel is of a broader
class than a ship, must be seagoing, and generally must operate in the marine environment.
161 Walker & Noyes, supra note 148, at 218. This definition was proposed by Professor Walker,
Professor Noyes disagreed with the definition. See Id. at 318-19.
162 Id. at 218.
63 Fesko, supra note 7.
'64 Walker & Noyes, supra note 148, at 318-19.
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the UNCLOS to broadly protect the marine environment, the definition of
ship should encompass temporarily fixed platforms.165 Regardless of being
either in transport or on site, these floating barges are a vessel under the
UNCLOS. As a result, Russia is obligated to operate these barges in a
manner consistent with the UNCLOS.
2. Russia's Regulatory Obligations Under the UNCLOS Result in a Duty
to Prevent Pollution from the Operation or Accidents Associated With
Floating Reactors
The UNCLOS contains many well-defined duties that Russia, as a
party to the convention, is obligated to follow. The UNCLOS requirements
include general obligations to "protect and preserve the marine
environment"'' 66 and to "take all measures necessary to ensure that activities
under their jurisdiction or control are so conducted as not to cause damage
by pollution to other States and their environment.' 167  The UNCLOS
incorporates a broad definition of pollution including the "introduction by
man, directly or indirectly, of substances or energy into the marine
environment, including estuaries"'' 68 that either is likely to result in or in fact
results in "harm to living resources and marine life, hazards to human health,
hindrance to marine activities, including fishing and other legitimate uses of
the sea, impairment of quality for use of sea water and reduction of
amenities.' 169 In an extension of customary international environmental
law, Article 194 mandates measures "necessary to protect and preserve rare
or fragile ecosystems as well as the habitat of depleted, threatened or
endangered species and other forms of marine life.' 170 Further, Article 196
prescribes a duty to prevent, reduce, and control pollution from technologies
under a state's control, 17 and Article 199 mandates the development of
contingency plans to respond to incidents of pollution to the marine
environment. 1 2 In addition, Article 204 prescribes a duty to monitor the
environment for potential adverse impacts, 73 while Article 206 prescribes a
duty to assess the potential impacts and risks of activities to the
165 id.
166 UNCLOS, supra note 134, at art. 192.




171 Id. at art. 196.
172 Id. at art. 199.
171 Id. at art. 204.
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environment. 74 Finally, Article 211 prescribes a standard for the rules and
regulations that must be promulgated by a state to prevent pollution from a
vessel to the environment.175
a. As a party to the UNCLOS, Russia is also obligated to follow
generally accepted international rules and standards in the operation
offloating reactors
Although Russia is not directly bound by the IAEA treaties, UNCLOS
Article 211 may indirectly bind Russia to the standards set forth in such
treaties.176 Pursuant to Article 211, guidelines adopted by Russia to protect
the environment must "at least have the same effect as that of generally
accepted international rules and standards established through the competent,,.. ,177
international organization or general diplomatic conference. Given the
unique nature of Russia's proposal to build floating reactors for power
generation, the IAEA conventions, including the Convention on Nuclear
Safety, would be the most widely accepted and followed standards.
78
Scholars agree that the scope of Article 211 includes internationally agreed
standards including IAEA guidelines. 179 Similarly, established international
rules and procedures would govern the construction and operation of the
floating reactors. 80 As the flag state, Russia has a duty to ensure that its
barges do not sail unless they are built to international rules and standards
"established through competent international organization or general
diplomatic conference."' 18' Further, the barges' safety and security, and their
susceptibility to terrorist attack, could be addressed by international
standards such as the IAEA's Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of
Radioactive Sources,' 82 and other rules promulgated by the IAEA. 1
8 3
'74 Id at art. 206.
T ld.at art. 211.
176 Id.at art. 211.
' Id. at art. 211(2).
17' For a summary of the relevant technical guidelines, see http://www.iaea.org (last visited Apr. 28,
2004).
1'9 PATRICIA BIRNIE & ALAN BOYLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT 353-54 (2nd ed.
2002).
:so UNCLOS supra note 134, at art. 217.
181 Id.
82 IAEA, Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources (2004), available at
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Standards/index.html (last visited May 21, 2004).
183 See generally http://www.iaea.org//Publications/Documents/index.html (last visited May 21,
2004).
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b. The coastal host state's obligations under the UNLCOS are the same
as Russia's only if the barges are located in their territorial waters or
an accident results in pollution of the marine environment
Because a state has sovereignty over its internal waters, the UNCLOS
does not prescribe any mandatory duties regarding the environmental
stewardship of those waters. Under Articles 21 to 25, a state may choose to
regulate the discharge of pollution to its internal waters.' 84 For example,
Article 21 gives coastal states the authority to adopt laws to protect the
living resources of their waters' 85 and to preserve the marine environment by
reducing and controlling sources of pollution to those waters."' Article 23
specifically addresses the transportation of nuclear materials through
territorial waters, imposing a duty on that vessel to adhere to "special
precautionary measures established for such ships by international
agreements."
187
A port state's right to prescribe laws to protect its internal waters,
however, are not obligations owed to the greater international community.
Rather, they are rights to be enjoyed and exercised by the port state,' s8
including the right to undertake investigations and inspections of the vessel's
stewardship of the marine environment 1 9 and the right of the port state to
prevent a vessel from sailing if its seaworthiness would threaten the marine
environment. 90 If a coastal state chooses to host one of Russia's floating
reactors in its internal waters, however, that state is unlikely to adopt rules
and laws that would impede the operation of such reactors, as this is likely to
unnecessarily increase the transaction costs of using these reactors. Because
of this sovereignty over internal waters, any obligation to protect the marine
environment springs from the obligation not to pollute the marine
environment in Articles 192 and 194, but the coverage of those articles is
ambiguous.
The ambiguity of the extent of coverage of Articles 192 and 194
results from the lack of a clear definition of "marine environment" in the
UNCLOS, inasmuch as the UNCLOS seems to treat estuaries1 9 1 differently
in different articles. In Article 194, the definition of the marine environment
's4 UNCLOS, supra note 134, at arts. 21-25.
's Id. at art. 21(1)(d).
IS6 Id. at art. 21(1)(f).
87 Id. at art. 23.
"g See BIRNIE & BOYLE, supra note 179, at 370-71.
:89 UNCLOS, supra note 134, at art. 218.
90 Id. at art. 219.
191 An estuary is the interface between a river and the ocean.
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includes estuaries, but Article 207, which covers pollution from land-based
sources, appears to group estuaries as part of land-based sources,
presumably part of internal waters.' 92  This dual treatment of estuaries
suggests that there is a dual obligation to prevent pollution to estuaries
(included in the marine environment in Article 194)193 and to prevent
pollution migrating from estuaries to the marine environment (as estuaries
are included in Article 207's land-based sources).1 94 This dual treatment is
not surprising considering that estuaries are the interface between fresh
water (considered internal waters) and the ocean.' 95  As such, they may
straddle the baseline, as defined by maritime charts, and be both internal
waters and territorial waters.
c. Enforcement of obligations and liability under the UNCLOS and
international law would be difficult
While the duty not to pollute the oceans and liability for breach of that
duty are developed in both customary international law and under the
UNCLOS, as in customary international law, an injured state is unlikely to
be able to enforce such liability.' 96 Article 235 binds parties to their
UNCLOS "obligations concerning the protection and preservation of the
marine environment."' 97  If those obligations are not met, states "shall be
liable in accordance with international law."' 98 By referencing international
law, Article 235 codifies international customary law, and as such, binds
signatories to the UNCLOS to that law.
There is however, an overall reluctance by states to be bound by
international liability agreements - a reflection of the "lack of political will,
192 Article 207 groups estuaries, along with rivers, which are internal waters, as "land-based sources"
of pollution, which are, according to Article 194, a part of the marine environment. UNCLOS, supra note
134, at arts. 194, 207. It appears that the distinction between the marine environment and internal waters is
the baseline. As estuaries are the natural interface between terrestrial, fresh waters, and the marine
environment, it is not surprising that these water bodies could be viewed as both internal waters and a part
of the marine environment, as they will sometimes straddle the baseline.
'93 See supra Part IV.C.2.
94 If a country that is a party to the UNCLOS has these reactors under its jurisdiction or control, it
has an obligation to prevent pollution of the marine environment. See UNCLOS, supra note 134, at arts.
192, 194.
'95 For instance, the American Heritage Dictionary defines estuary as "I. The part of the wide lower
course of a river where its current is met by the tides; 2. An arm of the sea that extends inland to meet the
mouth of a river." NEW AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 466 (2d ed.).
196 For a general discussion on the inability of the international community to develop state liability,
see LEFEBER, supra note 120. An example of the reluctance of a state to be bound by a liability convention
is Russia's reluctance to ratify the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage. See supra
Part IV.A.3.
197 UNCLOS, supra note 134, at art. 235(1).
'" Id. at art. 194(5).
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[and] the alleged legal complexity of liability regulations."' 99 Recognizing
this, Article 235 also prescribes the duty to "ensure that recourse is available
in accordance with their legal systems for prompt and adequate
compensation or other relief' for activities caused by parties within their
jurisdiction. 200  Finally, Article 235 requires state cooperation in the
implementation of existing international law,20 1 further development of
international law relating to liability and responsibility,20 2 and development
of standards and procedures for ensuring adequate compensation, including
compulsory insurance or compensation funds.20 3 This article attempts to
resolve the lack of international liability regimes by prescribing both the
duty to provide a domestic forum for recovery of damages and the duty to
cooperate in the development of international liability regimes. Because
these forums do not exist, however, the UNCLOS also provides for specific
avenues for settlement of disputes arising between parties to the
convention.2 °4
Article 287 provides four different avenues for settlement of these
disputes arising under the UNCLOS: 1) the International Tribunal for the
Law of the Sea ("ITLOS"); 2) the International Court of Justice ("ICJ") 3)
an arbitral panel that can be constituted for general disputes; or 4) a special
arbitral panel for certain categories of disputes.20 5 Article 298 allows a state
206to choose the applicability of such forums when ratifying the treaty. For
protection of the marine environment, Russia has only consented to the
jurisdiction of a special arbitral panel, not the ICJ or the ITLOS.2 °7
However, if a party brings a claim against Russia under the UNCLOS, and
the forum cannot be agreed upon, then, under Articles 287(3) and 287(5)
recourse would be through a general arbitral panel.2 °8  Therefore, the
effectiveness of these panels would undoubtedly influence the manner in
which Russia would behave in building and operating these floating reactors.
In addition, a concerned party may, through Article 290, also bring a request
for provisional measures through the ITLOS, a procedure that could lead to
1- See LEFEBER, supra note 120, at 53.
200 UNCLOS, supra note 134, at art. 235(1).
20 Id. at art 235(3).
202 id.
203 id.
204 Id. at art. 287.
25 Id. at art. 287(1).
206 Id. at art. 298.
207 See Declaration of the Russian Federation Upon Signature and Upon Ratification, available at
http://untreaty.un.org/ENGLISH/bible/englishinternetbible/partl/chapterXX/treaty6.asp#Declarations (last
visited May 21, 2004).
208 UNCLOS, supra note 134, at art., 287(3), (5).
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the ITLOS stopping Russia's deployment of these reactors while dispute
resolution proceeded through the use of an arbitral panel. 20 9  This has
occurred three times in the young history of the ITLOS, with varying
effectiveness. 210  However, these procedures are reactive rather than
proactive in nature, consume large amounts of time, and are still developing
as a legal tool. Further, once provisional measures are prescribed,2' the
dispute would be resolved through an arbitral panel, as Russia has not
consented to ICJ or ITLOS jurisdiction. While the UNCLOS, makes a
major advance in both articulating standards and duties regarding the
protection of the environment, and providing obligatory dispute resolution
mechanisms, its value is still questionable in providing a binding
international liability regime for recovery of damages resulting from
activities that pollute the marine environment.
V. As INTERNATIONAL LAW FAILS TO EFFECTIVELY ADDRESS THE RISKS
OF RUSSIA'S FLOATING REACTORS, CONCERNED STATES SHOULD
ACTIVELY PROMOTE EFFECTIVE LEGAL REGIMES OR DEVELOP AND
DEPLOY ALTERNATIVE TECHNOLOGIES
Given the risks associated with Russia's proposal to deploy floating
nuclear reactors and the real possibility that Russia may ignore those risks,
the international community should proactively address this pressing issue.
The international community has at least three main options: 1) close the
current gaps in existing law to cover the risks posed by the floating reactors;
2) develop new legal regimes to specifically address these risks; or 3)
actively promote development of alternative technologies that would meet
the same demand that the floating reactors are currently designed to address.
Regarding this last option, there is also the opportunity for the international
community to proactively develop alternative sustainable technologies to
meet increasing power demands.
259 Id. art. 290.
210 See Case Concerning Land Reclamation by Singapore in and Around the Straits ofJohor
(Malaysia v. Singapore), INT'L TRIBUNAL FOR THE LAW OF THE SEA, Case No. 12, available at
http://www.itlos.org/cgi-bin/cases/case-detail.pl?id=12&lang=en (last visited May 21, 2004); The MOX
Plant Case (Ireland v. United Kingdom), 42 I.L.M. 405 (2002); Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases (New
Zealand v. Japan; Australia v. Japan), 38 I.L.M. 1624 (1999).
211 See Declaration of the Russian Federation Upon Signature and Upon Ratification, supra note
207.
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A. Current Legal Regimes May Be Modified to Proactively Address the
Risks of Russia's Floating Nuclear Reactors
The gaps in the current customary international law and treaty-based
legal regimes outlined above could be closed, resulting in coverage of
floating reactors by these regimes. Given the slow development of liability
under customary international law (reflected in the lack of a general forum
for recovery for damages resulting from a breach of customary international
law), modification of existing treaties may be a more efficient method of
addressing this issue. For instance, the CNS could be modified to
specifically cover floating nuclear reactors, but still exempt other reactors
used in maritime applications, such as those used to power military vessels.
Another alternative would be to amend the Vienna Convention to
specifically cover the floating reactors and somehow induce Russia to ratify
the convention. Another, and perhaps easier, alternative would be for the
IAEA to use its authority under the 1997 Vienna Convention amendments to
promulgate regulations covering these specific types of floating reactors. As
demonstrated by the Cosmos 954 incident, having a treaty to provide some
sort of liability in the event of an accident may make the difference between
some recovery and no recovery at all.
B. New Legal Regimes May Be Developed to Address the Risks Posed by
Floating Reactors
If the gaps in the current legal regimes outlined above cannot be
closed, a new regime would need to be developed to govern the unique risks
posed by these floating reactors. That framework would ideally mirror the
obligations to the environment contained in both customary law and the
UNCLOS, but would also balance the need for new power sources with the
risk inherent in some of those sources. Further, as demonstrated above,
there is a particular need to develop liability and a means for recovery for
damage. Finally, while ideally any new legal regime would afford the
international community the opportunity to preempt particularly risky
behaviors, there should at least be firm mechanisms for recovery of damages
resulting from the operation of these reactors.
A possible model for new law already exists in the Draft Articles on
the Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities ("Draft
Articles"). 212 These articles reflect the principles articulated in customary
212 International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm From
Hazardous Activities, U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001).
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international law, requiring states to take all appropriate measures to
minimize the risk of trans-boundary harm.2 13 The Draft Articles state that
those risks include both the high probability of causing significant harm, and
the low probability of causing disastrous harm.214 As the inability to
develop similar liability regimes called for in other international instruments
demonstrates, it is likely that the Draft Articles would suffer the same
deficiencies as other conventions in liability enforcement, if adopted. This
repeated theme of the inability to develop international liability regimes
suggests that non-legal solutions to this problem should be considered,
including international cooperation to develop and deploy the alternative
nuclear technologies discussed in Part II(B).
C. Market-Based Incentives to Adopt Alternative Technologies May Be
Necessary to Address Floating Reactor Risks
The international community should consider market-based incentives
to develop alternative technologies for power generation in the same niche
likely to be served by Russia's floating reactors. Ideally, that alternative
would not contribute to global warming through the emission of greenhouse
gases, nor would it pose an unacceptable risk to the environment. In
addition, as energy policy transitions from a national to an international
policy decision, the technology used should also be sustainable. 21 5 Those
technologies could include solar, wind, tide or other non-greenhouse
emitting sources, or alternative nuclear power sources.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Russian proposal to deploy floating nuclear reactors demonstrates
the need for increased international cooperation and vigilance regarding both
international human health and environmental policy. It also highlights the
need for a proactive approach to international regulation of emerging
technologies that have the potential for adverse impacts on not only a
regional, but a global level. As the scientific understanding of the impacts of
energy source choices increases, it is necessary for the global community to
move from a domestically oriented energy policy to one that accounts for the
global impacts of state actors' decisions. Such impacts will be borne not
only by the acting state, but by the international community as a whole.
Regardless of the approach taken by the international community, such an
213 Id.
'14 Id. at art. 2(a).
215 See WEC Sustainable Development Perspective, supra note 29.
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approach ideally will be proactive and consistent with the need to address
and balance all risks associated with power generation. Failure to take any
action until an accident involving one of these floating nuclear reactors may
impact the marine environment irreparably, a risk that should not be
imposed unilaterally by a single country.
The best approach to preventing the risks associated with these
floating reactors is likely to be a mix of various cooperative tactics. First, a
cooperative international agreement could include incentives designed to
deploy safer technology in a cost-effective manner. This cooperative
approach could be coupled with the development of Generation IV
technology, or coupled with the adoption of other advanced reactor designs,
and could be administered through the IAEA or other international
organizations. Second, there should be strong controls over the operation of
these reactors to minimize safety risks. Finally, an agreement with countries
not to use the Russian floating reactors could be coupled with incentives and
assistance in developing alternative technologies. As a whole, this approach
could accomplish the goals of addressing the risks of these particular
reactors. This approach could also move energy policy into the international
arena, where the cooperation of states in identifying and developing
consistent policy will result in the inability of one state to act unilaterally in
a manner that is not acceptable to the overall international community.
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